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Bargaining and Efficiency in a Speculative 
Forward Market1
by
H. Peter M0llgaard 
International Office
Ministry for Business Policy Coordination 
Christiansborg Slotsplads 1 
DK-1218 Copenhagen K 
Denmark
Fax: +45-33924400
ABSTRACT: The 15-Day forward market for Brent crude oil is predominantly speculative. 
Transactions on this market thus contradict the assumptions that lead to zero speculation 
theorems. We set up a stochastic game model of a market with a small number of speculative 
traders that differ only with respect to the expected spot price and (possibly) with respect to 
risk aversion. Contracting is done after pairwise negotiations in random matches. The Markov 
perfect equilibrium of the model can mimic the 15-Day market and need not be efficient in 
the sense of belonging to the bilateral core.
1 Thanks are due to Jprgen Rugholm Jensen, Alan P. Kirman, Mordecai Kurz and Robert 
Waldmann for inspiring and encouraging discussions. Many thanks to Peter Hammond, 
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How do the participants in the 15-Day market for Brent blend crude oil get to agree upon 
forward contracts?
The 15-Day market is a peculiar decentralized market institution in which a 
homogeneous commodity is traded forward. The main purpose of this paper is to model the 
trading procedure and to assess whether the outcome of this procedure is efficient (in a sense 
to be made precise).
There are other market institutions that could serve the same purposes. The standard 
futures market is a case in mind. In contrast to the 15-Day market, this market institution is 
centralized. It is a priori more likely to lead to efficient outcomes since market clearing is 
made easy by the presence of a clearing house and since information is conveyed on a 
continuous basis. The International Petroleum Exchange (IPE) of London enjoys these 
characteristics but trading of Brent blend stops too soon before maturity to be a good 
substitute for the forward market. This problem could certainly be remedied as has been the 
case elsewhere and for other commodities. (In)divisibility is also an issue: The 15-Dav market 
operates in terms of cargoes of a standard size of 500,000 barrels, whereas the IPE contracts 
are specified in lots of 1,000 barrels.
Here the focus is on the trading procedure of the 15-Day market institution. The 
institutional features of this market will help specify a realistic model. These features are 
outlined in Section 1, which also illustrates a typical market outcome. We proceed by 
specifying the main characteristics of an oil trader in Section 2. Section 3 discusses a very 
simple model of two such traders to give us the feel for the problem. Section 4 goes on to 
the more complicated three person version of the game in which the problems of the general 
n-person model can be illustrated and exemplified. Section 5 generalizes to an n>2 person, 
finite time horizon game of pairwise bargaining after random matches and analyses whether 
efficiency can be achieved under the more realistic specification of bargaining options. 
Section 6 concludes by discussing convergence to efficiency and by comparing the 
decentralized forward market with a centralized futures market.
The main conclusion is that the model catches some important circumstances affecting 
15-Day traders and that it can mimic the observed outcome of the 15-Day forward market. 
The outcome is inefficient compared to a centralized market institution, but there is 
convergence to the efficient outcome as the time horizon gets longer. Measured against the 
standard model of a futures market, the 15-Day institution is inferior. Since a futures market 
(the IPE) exists and since the futures market institution has long been a well known way of 




























































































that the market participants accept such an inferior market institution.
1. The Characteristics of the 15-Day Market
Traditionally thought of as London-based, the 15-Day market cannot be said to have a proper 
home. However, many traders have their offices in London and most price reporting services 
are located there. The early development of the markets for North Sea crude oil is described 
in detail in Mabro et al. (1986).
For the purpose of this paper, a short account of the salient features of the 15-Day 
market institution will suffice:
1) Finite time horizon: A contract for oil to be delivered in a given month1 2 can only be 
traded during a given time interval. In order not to go into the complicated details regarding 
the timing of forward and spot transactions (on this, see Phlips (1992)), as a good 
approximation it is assumed that a given forward contract is traded during the last two and 
a half months prior to delivery. This allows around fifty trading days.
2) Limited number of players: "Though the number of market participants in 1980-85 
exceeded 110, we found that the number of continually active players was of the order of 30- 
35, and that the 10-15 top participants accounted for most of the activity. The top five 
participants comprised four oil traders and one major oil company" (Mabro et al. (1986) p. 
xx).
3) Pairwise negotiations: The 15-Day market does not exist physically, but consists of a 
network of market participants trading via telephone.
4) Standard contracts: The contract is of a type where the quantity is prespecified (500.000 
bl’s) so that the contractors only have to fill in the agreed price. For each matching of two
1 One explanation may be that the forward market automatically becomes the spot market 
in the sense that assignment of physical cargoes is done via chains of contracts that are left 
open when the forward market closes. This function could however be carried out in other 
ways. A centralization of this function would seem to make life easier for everybody involved 
in the market.
2 The timing of delivery is not further specified. Only when the spot market opens will 
the delivery be known with more precision (namely within a three day delivery range). It is 
this assignment of different buyers to different slots that would be made easier with a 




























































































traders this reduces the dimension of the bargaining problem from two to one: from (price x 
quantitity) to (price). The contract is binding in the sense that once it is telexed and therefore 
legally confirmed, the contractors cannot undo it before maturity and may thus end up with 
obligations to buy or sell oil on the spot market of the relevant forward month.3
5) The clearing mechanism is important for the same reason and involves two types of 
transactions: bookouts and daisy chains. A bookout is a situation where a number of players 
(at least two) can construct a circle of contracts (A sells to B, B to C, C to .., .. to A) and 
decide to close out by purely financial transfers. A daisy chain is similar but the chain is not 
closed to a circle: a cargo is passed on along a chain of traders and the last trader in the chain 
takes delivery. A daisy chain thus involves a cargo of physical oil at the end.
In addition to the institutional features we note that there is a great deal of speculation 
going on in the market. Bacon (1986) notes that:
"this market has been de facto dominated by speculative deals" (p.5)
and
"[a]n important factor is the dispersion of expectations held by traders: if 
expectations about price movements are widely spread then the number of 
deals can be high" (p. iii).
"All this activity (...) was greatly amplified by the involvement of speculators 
in the market who, by taking views on likely future prices, tried to make a 
margin on buying or selling short and then covering their positions at a later 
date. ... [T]here was also considerable variation in the total amount of trading 
month by month. We have suggested that an important part of this volatility 
in quantity was related to changes in the dispersion of expectations held by 
those speculating in the market. When there was consensus on the likely price 
outcome the opportunities for trading decreased and when views were very 
disparate the number of deals increased." (pp. 48-49).
Take this as sufficient evidence that





























































































1) differences in expectations exist;
2) differences in expectations drive the speculative trade;
3) speculative trade dominates the 15-Day market.
The assumption that differences in expectations drive speculative trade is in straight 
contradiction with the zero-speculation or zero-trade theorems (see Milgrom and Stokey 
(1982) and Tirole (1982) or for a survey Geanakoplos (1992)) that follow from the rational 
expectations hypothesis or from an assumption about common knowledge of common priors. 
That differences in expectations drive speculative trade therefore needs justification which is 
given in Mpllgaard (1993). For the purpose of this paper, first note that the typical real world 
speculator seems to be much more confident about his own expectation (opinion) than game 
theory with common priors allows him to be. Second, even if people have the same 
information, this need not span a unique probability distribution leading to a unique spot price 
expectation (see also Kurz (1991)).
To characterize the forward market as entirely speculative is an obvious abstraction. 
In reality, there are four types of market participants, viz. non-integrated producers, non- 
integrated refineries, integrated oil companies and oil traders, but only the two first types of 
agents can be trusted to enter the market primarily for hedging purposes, and their overall 
significance is fairly limited. The physical production of Brent blend during a normal month 
is forty-two cargoes and hence hedging can explain no more than forty-two contracts4. The 
turnover on the 15-Day market is typically ten times this number. Integrated companies 
speculate about the future forward price and trade accordingly for tax purposes.5 Oil traders 
live from speculation, so it is a fair claim that the forward market is predominantly 
speculative.
A typical outcome of the 15-Day market in terms of the number of contracts traded 
and the corresponding prices is illustrated by the trading of the September 1991 contract. 
Trading took place in the period from 21 June to 30 August 1991, see Figures 1 and 2. Figure 
1 shows the price range of concluded deals on the different days of trading, while Figure 2
4 This argument ignores possible hedging of other crudes for which Brent is a substitute. 
To a certain extent forward markets for other North Sea crudes exist, but they are relatively 
unimportant. It is well known from the theory of futures markets that you can hedge 
imperfectly in forward contracts for an imperfect substitute.
5 See Bacon (1986) and Mabro et al. (1986) for a discussion of this. Clubley (1990, p. 




























































































Figure 1: Selected Brent forward deals 
for September 1991 (High - Low)
21
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Figure 3: September contracts on 
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l !
indicates the number of deals (each for a cargo of half a million barrels) on the same days. 
Needless to say, when only one deal was concluded on a given day, only one price obtained. 
This price is indicated with a dot in Figure 1. Figure 3 shows the price and the quantity 
(number of cargoes) traded on two consecutive trading days, July 24 and 25. The dataset does 
not provide an identification of the traders involved in any deal and it is thus difficult to 
know whether two cargoes sold at identical prices on a given day represent one or two trades.
The figures confirm the impression that when a lot of trade is observed, then the price 
dispersion is also large. Note that no causality is implied, a priori, in this statement. However, 
in the model that follows, a wide dispersion of spot price expectations across traders will 
cause them to trade larger quantities on the forward market. Because of the decentralized 
nature of trading in the 15-Day market, this leads to a wider range of forward prices being 
observed.
To capture the aforementioned features our model of the 15-Day market should include 
a finite number of players (traders/ speculators) that get matched pairwise and then bargain 
about the price of a unit of an indivisible good. They are only matched a finite number of 
times and since they are speculators they will want to close whatever open position they 
might have at maturity.




























































































one to two to three to n.
2. A Simple, Speculative Oil-Trader
Assume that the entire forward market is speculative. This means that no market participant 
has any interest in obtaining the underlying good, but only in buying cheap contracts on the 
forward market in order to sell them later at an expected higher price, or conversely, in 
selling expensive contracts to buy later at an expected lower price. Speculation is thus "sell 
high, buy low" with either happening first. Through most of the paper, it is aassumed that the 
forward market clears at maturity using the realization of the spot price. Accordingly, in this 
model, all contracts are supposed to be held till maturity. Some important problems regarding 
the clearing mechanism at maturity will be discussed later.
We employ two further assumptions of a technical nature: 1) The trader perceives the 
spot price as a normally distributed random variable; and 2) she is risk averse. To be specific, 
assume that her preferences can be represented by a utility function that is (negative) 
exponential in profits. The joint assumption of a normal spot price and an exponential utility 
function allows us to express the objective function according to the mean-variance model.
Thus the spot price, p \  has a "subjective mean" p, and is assumed to have a known 
variance a 2 = /  (this allows us to concentrate on differences in opinion about first order 
moments):
p ’ ~ N (p r l)  (1)
Trader / ’s expected profit from a forward transaction in period f is
n, = (%  ~ (2)
where qt, is the price of the contract and /, ,  the quantity sold. The expected profit from a 
given contract cn = (q,rf,j) is positive if the forward price is higher than the mean spot price 
(qtJ > p,) and if the trader sells forward (/,, > 0). Conversely, if the forward price is lower 
than the expected spot price, the expected profit will be positive only if the trader goes long 
(i.e. buys forward: f u < 0).
Let h,(l) = (cn , cl2, .... clx) be trader I’s history of trades from the first day of 
trading (t = 1) up to and including day T. The expected profit that arises from this history is 
simply the sum of the single-deal expected profits, given that the trader’s spot price 




























































































(3)M / V )  = E ( %  - P,>fu = v <hi<^> -  P,F(h,W)
t=l
where Vfh/x)) = e l , qt J f t is the (known) book value of the trader’s forward position and
F M J  = E L ,  f t t is the trader’s net position. We consider a trading period short enough for 
discounting to be ignored. Given our assumptions, the objective function at time % can be 
written
GCtyTj.A,,/;,) = 7t(h,(z)) -  ^ F 2(h,(x)) (4)
where A, is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion, here assumed to be constant. 
The trading stops at a known date T  (>/) and the trader's objective (TO) is thus:
Maxlh(T)l G(hjT);Al.pl) (5)
Summing up, this section proposed the following assumptions:
A1 The typical forward market participant is a speculator.
A2 The forward market clears using the realization of the spot price at maturity.
A3 Each trader /  perceives the spot price as a normal stochastic variable with mean p, 
and variance 1.
A4 The trader has risk-averse preferences that can be presented by a utility function 
which is exponential in profits.
From these four assumptions we derived the trader’s objective function which is quadratic in 
the net position F  and we formulated the trader’s objective (TO).
3. Two Traders with Differing Beliefs
Assume for the purpose of this section that the forward market consists of two traders. If they 
trade, it must be with each other. When they agree to a contract, they know that their spot 
price expectations differ. If they have identical spot price expectations, they do not want to 
trade since trading would expose them to a risk. We thus assume that agents are endowed 




























































































they will want to trade if expectations are sufficiently diverse. In the following, different 
"solutions" to the two players’ problems are examined.
3.1 Axiomatic Approaches
Name the two agents 7 and J. Agent 7 expects the spot price to be p, and J expects py, assume 
these expectations to be common knowledge. 7 and J agree that the spot price variance is one. 
They have risk preferences A, and A, respectively. Since they are the only two on the market, 
what one trader sells, the other must buy and we shall take /  to signify 7’s short position 
(signed) w'hich then is J's  long position.
Arbitrarily assume p,>Pj, set 7=7 and/or suppress the time-index. The two TO's 
thereby become
where c = (qj).
I f  I  and J  were price-takers, q would be exogenous to the traders and should somehow 
adjust to clear the market. Then the competitive equilibrium would be obtained, with
Here 7 buys from J  a position that is proportional to the difference in spot price expectations 
at a price that is a weighted average of their price expectations, the weights being the risk 
aversion constants: If 7 is more risk averse, J’s spot price expectation gets a higher weight 
and vice versa. The competitive equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 4.
With only two traders, or in general as long as the number of players is so small that 
any player perceives that she can influence the market outcome, price taking appears to be 
a highly artificial constraint on behaviour and the competitive solution does not carry much 
appeal, so we discard this approach.
Let us instead turn the problem upside down: Just studying the traders’ objectives and 
without imposing further structure on the problem, what can be said about the set of contracts 
that they would agree to?
A f 2






























































































F ig u r e  4: C o m p e t i t i v e  E q u i l i b r i u m ,  
IR C o n t r a c t s  a n d  B i l a t e r a l  Core
0
The minimum requirement on any contract must be that it contributes non-negatively 
to the contractors’ payoffs, that is, that it be individually rational (IR) fo r both.6 This 
condition is satisfied by contracts in the set
{(q,0)} U f< 0  , Pj -  < q < p, + 1 / |  (9)
which is the vertical axis plus the big triangle in Figure 4. Any contract interior to the triangle 
is strictly preferred by both parties to no trade. A contract on the vertical axis trivially 
contributes zero to the expected payoff of both traders (zero volume, zero trade). A contract 
on the upper line (q = p, + '/iA,f) of the triangle would contribute zero to / ’ s expected payoff, 
whilst a contract on the lower line (q = Pj - VzAjf) gives J zero expected payoff. We shall 
require that any contract be individually rational to both. This only amounts to saying that a 
trader only contracts if she finds it advantageous, which seems a natural and minimal 
requirement.
A stronger requirement would be that the outcome belong to the bilateral core. This 




























































































of the organization of the market, in order for the market outcome to be called efficient, it 
should belong to the bilateral core.
Definition: The bilateral core is the set of contracts that is coalitionally rational, where the 
set of permissible coalitions is restricted to all singletons and all pairs.
In other words, the bilateral core is the set of contract allocations that cannot be blocked by 
coalitions of one or two agents and that satisfy participation constraints. Note that in general 
this is a different requirement than Pareto efficiency. In the two-person case the bilateral core 
is identical to the core and a strict subset of the Pareto efficient allocations. For now it 
suffices to note that individual rationality of an outcome means that no singletons can form 
a blocking coalition and our two person case therefore reduces to finding the contract curve 
in the set of IR contracts. This can be done by equalizing the marginal rate of substitution 
between price, q, and quantity,/, for the two players. The bilateral core in the two person case 
is:
It is illustrated in Figure 4 as the vertical bar in the triangle. The quantity is the same as that 
of the competitive solution, but the price can be anywhere in the interval between the seller’s 
(7’s) reservation price and the buyer’s (/’s) reservation price.
The question is whether we can rely on economic principles to restrict the solution to 
the bilateral core. This is one of the recurring issues of the paper, so we should not expect 
an easy answer. Note that the competitive equilibrium belongs to the core, as should be. 
Another solution concept that has been applied to a problem of this type (see Brianza, Phlips 
and Richard (1990) p. 13) is the Nash-Bargaining point. Provided that the disagreement event 
is taken to be that no contract is telexed, the generalized (asymmetric) Nash bargaining 
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(3AJ+Al)pl + (3A,+Aj)pj 
4fA,*Aj)
(12)
where the price expectation of the less risk averse agent gets the higher weight. This price 
will coincide with the competitive price (8) only if A, = Aj. Otherwise, the difference between 
the competitive price and the symmetric Nash bargaining price will be:
so that the seller (J) is better off with competitive pricing than with Nash bargaining if she 
is more risk averse than the buyer (I) and vice versa.
The generalized solution (11) belongs to the bilateral core (10). Indeed, the bilateral 
core is equivalently described by (11) letting a  run from zero to one.
The weights in w, and ny in (11) have the following interpretation in addition to what 
was said about (12): The stronger I is (i.e. the higher a  is), the closer is the price of the 
contract to J’s reservation price as given by (10). Conversely, the stronger J  is, the closer q 
gets to / ’s reservation price. Generally, the stronger an agent is relative to the other, the more 
the forward price will reflect the other’s spot price expectation.
Since the Nash bargaining approach is axiomatic, the solution by construction enjoys 
some nice properties: it is invariant to equivalent utility representations; it is symmetric if the 
problem is symmetric; it is independent of irrelevant alternatives; and it is Pareto efficient. 
The joint effect of these four axioms is even a unique outcome, but for our purpose we cannot 
use the approach since we would then assume what we want to show (efficiency of the 
outcome). Axiomatic approaches are silent on matters of timing and procedures and we 
therefore adopt a non-cooperative strategic bargaining approach to analyse whether and under 
which conditions the outcome of the given market institution is efficient.
3.2 Two Traders Bargaining Strategically
The strategic bargaining model as treated in Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) assumes that the 
players haggle over the price of a fixed quantity, taking turns in offering a price to the other 
and rejecting or accepting this offer. In the terminology of Rubinstein (1992), they attempt 
to partition a pie of a given size and once they agree on a partition, the game is over. Thus 
in our model, if the players are allowed to enter precisely one contract with a prespecified 
quantity, then the traders only haggle about the price. Given the finite time horizon, the price 
will either equal the seller’s reservation price if the buyer is the last to make an offer, or the 
buyer’s reservation price if the seller offers last. The one to make the final offer is the winner, 





























































































skims the cream off by making an offer equal to the receiver’s reservation value 
(appropriately defined), leaving the receiver just indifferent between accepting and rejecting. 
This feature is exploited repeatedly throughout the paper.
However, the Osbome/Rubinstein (1990) approach is not immediately applicable to 
the problem at hand. First, contrary to Rubinstein’s model and many other models, it is 
assumed here that players are infinitely patient but that the game has a finite time horizon. 
More importantly, we introduce indivisibilities and multiple trades: A contract c, has a 
prespecified quantity. We take this as the indivisible unit for which the traders try to establish 





if I sells a contract to J at t 
if I and J cannot agree at t 
if I buys a contract from J at t.
(14)
Accordingly, if the two traders want to achieve a forward position of a given size, F>1, at T, 
they will have to trade in at least F periods.
At any period, x, agent /  enters the period with accumulated expected payoff 
G(h/(X-l);A,,p,) and exits with accumulated payoff G(h/(x);Al ,pi), so the incremental single 
period expected payoff is
g<h,(x);Ar p,) = /,(<?, -  p, -  A- f z -  A M h J X - l ) ) ) .  (15)
which depends on history only through the accumulated net position. If no contracting is done 
in period x, then g(/i/x);A,,p,j = 0. If a contract is sold (fx = /)  or bought (fx = -7), the price 
must be individually rational, i.e.
A '  l= > q x * P , + ± + A f ( h f i - l ) ) * R S W  (16)
A = -1 => qx Z P, - y  + Affh/x-l))  = RBfx).
We shall use RS,(x) and RB/x) as a convenient short-hand for / ’ s myopic7 reservation prices 
as a seller and as a buyer, respectively, and bear in mind that they evolve over time, 
depending in the shown way on / ’ s forward position in the preceding period. If the trader is 
already net short (F (h /x-l)) > 0) this raises the selling reservation price but it also raises the 
maximum price at which she is willing to buy. This is so, since an additional unit sold
7 Myopic since it does not take future payoffs into account. A forward looking reservation 
price would do this and thus require backward recursion or, equivalently, subgame perfection. 




























































































increases the riskiness of the overall position, whilst buying a unit reduces the short position 
and thereby the risk exposure. Figure 5 illustrates this for trader I and for a given x: the 
intercept of the line with the g-axis is p, + A, F(hfx-l)). Only when F (h /x-l)) = 0 will the 
intercept equal the trader’s spot price expectation.
The intercept and the two vertical lines indicate the set of IR contracts to /  given the 
indivisible unit. A convenient fact is
RS/x) = RB/x) + A,. , i g IU I, Vt. (17)
The following lemma commands full generality (that is to say it applies to all versions 
of the game independently of the number of players):
Lemma 1: RS,(x) < RB/x) => RS/x) > RB/x).
Proof: Follows directly from (17): RS/x) = RBfx) + A <R S/x) = R B/x) -  A,
=>RS/x) > RB/x) + A, + A j>  RBfx) ■
Lemma 1 simply states that if there exists a contract where I sells to J that both 




























































































IR where J sells to I  that both players find IR. The next lemma gives a dynamic extension 
of Lemma 1:
Lemma 2: Assume that two players, I and J, are matched in period x-1. Then RS/x-1) < 
RB/x-1) => RB/x) < RS/x).
Proof: If the two players do not enter a contract at x-1, then RS/x) = RS/x-1) and RB/x) = 
RB/x-1) (because F(h/x)) = F (h /x-l))) and the conclusion follows directly from Lemma 1 
(with strict inequality). If the players do enter a contract at x-1, then F(h/x-l)) = F(h/x-2)) 
+ 1 and F (h /x -l)) = F(h/x-2)) - 1, so RS/x) = RS/x-1) + A, and RS/x) = RS/x-1) - Aj. 
However, from (17) it then follows that RB/x) = RS/x-1) and R S/x) = RB/x-1). Since the 
condition of the Lemma is a weak inequality, the conclusion will also be a weak inequality. ■
Lemma 2 states that if, in period x-1, there are gains from a trade where /  sells to J, 
then there cannot be gains from a trade where J sells to I  in period X, given that the two 
agents are matched in x-1. If they were not matched in x-1 they could be matched to other 
agents in x-1 and enter contracts that would disturb the conclusion. Here we concentrate on 
the two player case, where I and J are matched with each other in every period.
Remark: In the two player case, Lemma 2 implies that, in general, trade between I and J 
always goes in the same direction: 1 sells to J if p, < pd and J  sells to I  if p, > pj.
Corollary: If RS/x-1) = RB/x-1) and 1 and J enter a contract at x-1, then RB/x) = R S/x) = 
RS/X-1) — RB/x-1) = qlz.i = qJx.i-
Remark: If, in the two player case, the situation of the corollary to Lemma 2 occurs, then 
the net positions in x-2 and x-1 are
F(h/x-2)) = Pj Pl -  L  and F (h fx-l))  =
A, + Aj 2 A, + Aj
1
~2
which must both be integers. In this case, the agents can cycle back and forth between these 
two positions (recall / ’s position is always the negative of J ’s), each time trading at the 
competitive price and each trade adding zero to both trader’s expected payoff. In fact, the two 
positions are defined by requiring that the marginal trade adds zero to both players expected 
payoff.
Generically, the positions mentioned in the remark will not be integers, and we have 
the following proposition determining the maximum value of the open interest which is then 




























































































Proposition 1: Assume without loss of generality that p, > pj. Generically, the upper bound 
on the open interest is
F(h/x)) -F(hfx)) < P , - P j  J  
A, +Aj 2
= ND. ( 18)
Proof: Define 8 = — ----— +—
A] + Aj 2
P, ~ Pj J
A, + A, 2
de [0,1 ), and assume that the number of
Pi ~ Pi 1contracts already exchanged is F(h.(l)) = ----------  + _  -  5 , which is then an integer. In
A, + A j 2
this case, RS/x+ l) = q + (l-S)Aj > RB/x+l) = q - (l-d)A, and 
RSfx+1) = q + SA, > RB/x+l) = q - 5AJt
where q is the competitive price defined in equation (8) of Section 3.1. Only if 8=0 can there 
be any trade. This is the special case discussed above. Otherwise, we have RSfX+1) > 
RBj(x+l) and no trade is possible in x+i or thereafter, which implies that all gains from trade 
have been exploited. ■
Now we complete the description of the rules of the game by the assumption that 
when I and J are matched in period x, /  makes an offer to J  with probability 1/2 and J  makes 
an offer to I with probability 1/2. An offer takes the form o f a contract, i.e. essentially a price 
at which the offerer is willing to buy or sell one unit. The receiver o f the offer can take it or 
leave it; accept it or reject it. Then the game moves on to period x + lf
The following proposition outlines the backward recursion principle by which the 
game at hand can be solved by studying the effect of all possible actions in x on current 
period payoffs and on continuation payoffs (i.e. the expected value of the ensuing subgame) 
and letting the agents maximize over these actions: 8
8 In terms of expected utility, the effect of the assumption that in any match either of the 
two agents has probability 1/2 of proposing to the other is the same as that of assuming Nash 
bargaining between the two agents in the match. This holds true also for the n-person game 
of Section 5 if the threat points are defined to be the continuation value to each of the agents 




























































































Proposition 2: Let p, > pj and suppose that expected continuation payoffs are of the same
form
vfT*1) = L \p , -  Pj -  (A, + AJXF(hJ( z ) ) * l )
for both players. Then, if /  is chosen to make an offer at x, she will offer to buy a contract 
from J at the price
A,+A, (19)
qT = RS/%) (20)
which J  will accept. If J  is chosen to make an offer, she will offer to sell a contract to /  at 
the price
(21)
which /  will accept. Thus, in both cases F(hjx)) = F(h,(x-1))-1 and F(hjx)) = F(hj(x-I))+1. 
Ex ante, i.e. seen ftom period x-1, the expected payoff to both players will then be
vfx) = i ( p ,  -  Pj -  (A, * AJ(F(h/x-1))+!-)). (22)
Proof: v(x+l)>  (A, + Aj)/4 implies that F(hj(x)) < P, -  Pj 
A, -  A,
1, which ensures that there are
1R contracts to be made in period x. Consider the case in which /  is chosen to make an offer 
to J. If J  accepts, F(hjx)) = F (h/x-lj) + 1, if she rejects, F(h/x)j = F(lij(x-1)>. By- 
hypothesis, J’s expected continuation payoff in the case of acceptance is
v “(X+l) = L(p, -  Pj -(A, + Aj)(F(h/X-l)) * 1 * i ) ) ,
whilst in the case of rejection it is
v Y x+l) = i ( p ,  -  Pj -(A , + Aj)(F(hj(x-l)) + L » .
J then loses vYX+l) - v“(X+f) = (A, + Aj)/2 in terms of future payoff by accepting and / ’ s offer 
should compensate J for this loss in order to induce acceptance. This can be done by offering 
a contract price such that g(h/x)) = (A,+Aj)/2 => q, = RS/x)+(A,+Aj)/2 => g(h,(x)) = p, - Pj 
+ (Ai + Aj)(F(h/(x-l)) - 1) > 0 by the assumption that v(x+/j > (A, + Aj)/4. This last 
assumption implies that it is not optimal for the offerer to construct an offer that is certain 




























































































make an offer to I follows a similar argument.
This shows that, seen from period x-1, with probability 1/2 a player will expect to get 
p,~ Pj  + (A, + Aj)(F(hj(x-l)) - 1)> 0, and with probability 1/2 she will get (A,+Aj)/2 summing 
to:
If Ai = Aj, the expected price will be identical to the competitive price. If A, ^  A,, the 
expected price will show a trend, that will be positive if Aj > A, and negative in the other 
case. Particular realizations of the price will be as indicated in Proposition 2.
Equilibrium in this model is a situation in which I and J  maximize G(h/(T)) and 
G(h/T)) respectively. If the agents follow the recursive formula of Proposition 2, then 
equilibrium will be subgame perfect. There are two cases to be considered: If T < ND, there 
are not enough periods to allow the agents to reach the upper bound on the open interest, ND: 
They have to stop trading before all gains from trade are exploited. On the other hand, if T 
> ND, they can exhaust the gains from trade (under the restriction imposed by the 
indivisibility of a contract). The following lemma shows that they must exhaust all gains from 
trade if they can:
Lemma 3: Let p, > pj and assume that T > ND. Then F(h/T)) = ND is (generically) a 
necessary condition for equilibrium.
Proof: First assume that F(h/T)) < ND. Then F(h,(T)) < — — —  -  — -  8, where we used
* A, + Aj 2
the fact that F  is an integer. If 5 *  0, this implies that RS/T) < RB/T) so that a contract could 
be set up which would give a non-negative incremental payoff to both traders and a strictly 
positive payoff to at least one, in contradiction with optimality. If 6 = 0, we could have the 
special case where the marginal contract gives both zero incremental profit. In this case 
F(h/T)) = ND - l , is a necessary condition for equilibrium.
Hence F(h/T)) > ND. By Proposition 1, F(h/T)) < ND, so we have FfhJT)) = ND. ■
Eg(h^x)) = (p, - pj + (A, + Aj)(F(h/x-l)) - l/2))/2 
which is the same as (20) because F(h,) = -F(hj)M





























































































Proposition 2: Let p, > Pj and suppose that expected continuation payoffs are of the same
form
vfT*1) = L \p , -  Pj -  (A, * AJ)(F(hJ( z ) ) * i )
for both players. Then, if I is chosen to make an offer at x, she will offer to buy a contract 
from J at the price
y ^
q, = R S/x) (20)
which J  will accept. If J  is chosen to make an offer, she will offer to sell a contract to /  at 
the price
qT = RB/X)
A ,*  A, 
2
( 21)
which /  will accept. Thus, in both cases Ffh/x)) = F (h/x-l))-l and F(hjx)) = F (h /x-l))+ l. 
Ex ante, i.e. seen fiom period x-1, the expected payoff to both players will then be
v(t) = L(p, -  Pj - (A, * AjHFthJx-l»*-!-)). (22)
Proof: v(x+l)> <A, + Aj)/4 implies that Ffh/x)) < 1, which ensures that there are
IR contracts to be made in period x. Consider the case in which /  is chosen to make an offer 
to J. If J accepts, F(h/x)) = F fh/x-1)) + 1, if she rejects, F(h/x)) = F(h/X-I)). By- 
hypothesis, J’s expected continuation payoff in the case of acceptance is
v “(x+1) = L(p, -  Pj -(A, + A j)(F (h /x - l»  + 1 * i)> ,
whilst in the case of rejection it is
v'(x+ l) = L(p, -  Pj -(A, + A j)(F (h /x-l)) + L)).
J  then loses vYx+7) - v“(x+f) = (A, + A //2  in terms of future payoff by accepting and / ’s offer 
should compensate J for this loss in order to induce acceptance. This can be done by offering 
a contract price such that g(hjx)) = (A,+Aj)/2 => q, = RS/x)+(A,+Aj)/2 => g(h,(x)) -  p, - Pj 
+ (A, + Aj)(F(h/x-l)) - 1) > 0 by the assumption that v(x+I) > (A, + Aj)/4. This last 
assumption implies that it is not optimal for the offerer to construct an offer that is certain 




























































































make an offer to 7 follows a similar argument.
This shows that, seen from period t-7, with probability 1/2 a player will expect to get 
p, - Pj + (A, + Aj)(F(h,(x-l)) - 1)> 0, and with probability 1/2 she will get (A,+Aj)/2 summing 
to:
Eg(hfx)) = (p, - pj + (A, + Aj)(F(hi(z-l)) - l/2))/2 
which is the same as (20) because F(h,) = -F(hj ).W
Remark: The expected period-T price will be:
Eq(z) = ELL-L  + Aj. ~ A ,(F(hJ(x - l)) -L ) .  (23)
If A, = Aj, the expected price will be identical to the competitive price. If A, *  AJ; the 
expected price will show a trend, that will be positive if Aj > A, and negative in the other 
case. Particular realizations of the price will be as indicated in Proposition 2.
Equilibrium in this model is a situation in which 7 and J  maximize G(h/T)) and 
G(hj(T)) respectively. If the agents follow the recursive formula of Proposition 2, then 
equilibrium will be subgame perfect. There are two cases to be considered: If T < ND, there 
are not enough periods to allow the agents to reach the upper bound on the open interest, ND: 
They have to stop trading before all gains from trade are exploited. On the other hand, if T 
> ND, they can exhaust the gains from trade (under the restriction imposed by the 
indivisibility of a contract). The following lemma shows that they must exhaust all gains from 
trade if they can:
Lemma 3: Let p, > pj and assume that T > ND. Then F(hj(T)) = ND is (generically) a 
necessary condition for equilibrium.
Proof: First assume that F(h/T)) < ND. Then F(h/T)) < — ----—  -  — -  5, where we used
A, + Aj 2
the fact that F  is an integer. If 8 ^  0, this implies that RS/T) < RB/T) so that a contract could 
be set up which would give a non-negative incremental payoff to both traders and a strictly 
positive payoff to at least one, in contradiction with optimality. If 8 = 0, we could have the 
special case where the marginal contract gives both zero incremental profit. In this case 
Ffh/T)) = ND - 7, is a necessary condition for equilibrium.




























































































Proposition 3: Let p, > pj. Then a subgame perfect equilibrium exists in which I  and J 
maximize G(hJT)) and G(hJT)) respectively. If T > ND, in the first T - ND periods 
equilibrium has
F(h,(x» = 0 = F(h/X)) (24)
v(x) = 0 (^S)
Eq(x) = Undefined (26)
For both T < ND and T  > ND, define u = x -  max/T - ND , 0). For x > max(T - ND , 0) (i.e. 
u>  0, equilibrium has
F(hfx)) — ~u — - F< h/T)) (27)
Proof: We need to prove that we can apply to both cases the backward recursion of 
Proposition 2 by showing that in period T  we get continuation payoffs of the form (19). If this 
is the case, then Proposition 2 showed in (22) that continuation payoffs in any earlier period 
take the same form. The rest of the proof follows from forward recursion from period 1 with 
F(h<(0)) m 0.
First consider the case in which T > ND. By Lemma 3 we know that F(h/T)) = ND. 
The trading must take place in the last ND periods. Before this, any trader can reject an offer 
hoping to become the first person to have an offer accepted sometime later, without 
sacrificing continuation payoffs, so it must be the case that F(hj(T-l)) = ND - 1. Then 
reservation prices are RSJT) = q - 8Ay and RB/T) = q* - SA(. In period T, there is no 
continuation to worry about, so the winner takes all. Seen from period T-l, both players then 
expect to gain
i(RB,(T) -  RSJT)) = 8 ±
If 5 > 1/2 this satisfies the condition of Proposition 2 that v(x+!) >(A, + AJ/4. If 5 < 1/2, we 
regress one period. By assumption we have F(hJT-2)) = ND - 2, so T-l reservation prices are 




























































































prices remain unchanged in period T where the winner takes all, so in order to induce 
acceptance at T-l, the offerer should compensate the other with the amount
LfRBfT-1) -  R S/T-1)) = 1(1 * 5)(A, * Aj),
which will then be the T-l incremental payoff to the acceptor. The offerer gets the same (the 
other half). Seen from period T-2, the continuation payoff is thus
/ A, + A,
v(T -l) = L(1  .+ 5)(A, + Aj) > ' J ,
so we can unravel the game from T-l backwards.
We next consider the case in which T < ND. We then have F(hJ(T-l)) = T-l, so RSJT) 
= pj + A /T  - 1/2) and RB,(T) = p, - A /T  - 1/2). Seen from T-l, continuation payoffs will be
v(T) = l ( p ,  -  Pj -  (A, + Aj)(T -  L )) .
v(T) > (A, + Aj)/4 iff T < (p ,- Pj)/(A, + Aj), but this follows by the assumption that T < ND. ■
The equilibrium that is outlined in Propositions 1 through 3 can be interpreted as a 
Markov Perfect Equilibrium:9 If we take as state variable (i) the forward positions of the 
previous period, t-1, (ii) the realization of who nature chooses to make an offer in the current 
period, x, and (iii) time, x, itself, then those are sufficient to determine what offer the agent 
should make and whether to accept or reject it in period x, taking the expected value of future 
actions into account. Indeed, the payoff relevant history is summarized by F(h/z-l)) = - 
F(hj(l-1)). Given a realization of the state variable, the offerer proposes a contract chosen 
such that the price exactly compensates the receiver for the loss in continuation payoff and 
leaves the receiver indifferent between accepting and rejecting. Equilibrium then requires her 
to accept. This is the essence of Proposition 2. Proposition 1 defines the ergodic states of the 
Markov chain that the Markov perfect equilibrium can be seen as: If the market reaches a 
state in which F(hj(l)) = ND, then the two traders have no further gains from trade and will 
stop trading, so all possible future states will have this quality. Lemma 3 says that if possible 
(T > ND), the Markov chain should end up in an ergodic state. Proposition 3 then states that, 
if possible, the market ends up in an ergodic state, exhausting all gains from trade. This will 
happen in the last ND periods, so in the first T-ND periods, nothing happens: The forward 
positions stay zero, there are no realizations of the price since all offers are rejected without 
any loss of continuation payoffs. In the last ND periods, the J’s forward position is increasing 
by one contract each period (and / ’ s is similarly decreasing) thus reaching ND when the game 
stops at T. This quantity is as efficient, i.e. as close to the bilateral core, as can be given the 
indivisibility. Prices are evolving around a trend (see (23)) if A, *  A, or take values randomly 
above and below the competitive price if A, = A,. All realized prices have to be individually




























































































rational, so the equilibrium is efficient for T > ND. If T < ND, there is a trade in each period, 
so at the end of the game F(h/T)) = T and prices evolve as in the other case. This 
equilibrium can by construction not be efficient, but given the time constraint the players get 
as close to efficiency as possible.
In short, the two trader game yields a unique Markov perfect equilibrium that is as 
efficient as possible given the time constraint. In this model the only uncertainty stems from 
who is going to make an offer in each period. The identity of the opponent is known with 
certainty. This is not the case with three or more players.
4. Three Traders with Differing Beliefs
This section extends the two-player results to three players as an appetizer to the «-person 
game. While the extension of the axiomatic approaches is relatively straightforward, the 
extension of the strategic approach to a dynamic, stochastic game proves to be trickier.
4.1 Axiomatic Approaches and the Phlips-Harstad Model
It is a matter of simple algebra to extend the static analysis of Section 3.1 to a three trader 
market, thereby obtaining a simple version of the model in Phlips and Harstad (1991): In our 
model the traders on the forward market have no power in the spot market, whereas in the 
Phlips/Harstad model they do. However, this simplification has no importance for the 
discussion of the efficiency of the forward market.
A straightforward extension of the notation is needed: The traders are called I, J  and 
K and f jt i=I,J,j=J,K, frj, denotes the amount that i sells to j  at price qlr If/", is negative, then 
i buys from j  as before. Suppressing the time dimension, the payoff function for, say, I  now 
reads
G (r A ,,Pl) = (<?„ -  p,)ftJ + (qlK -  p,)fIK -  fu (30)




























































































q ' = ( A ^ P ,  ♦ A,AKP, + AêAjPk)/D 
f i  = (A/P k -  Pi) + A k(Pj -  Pi»/D 
f j  = (a k<P, -  Pj) + AfP K ~ Pj»/D
I k = (A/P , -  PK) + AfPj -  Pk))/D
where D = A^^. + A;Aj + AjA^ .
(31)
The set of contracts that are individually rational for any two players, say I and J, is 
described by
{(<?„/„) I f , j>° ■ Pj +  ̂P, + ^ ( f , +f j } U
f , j<0 ’ Pj + ^ f j +fjK) * 9,J Z P, + ^ f , +f j } U
H J J I 4 = 0 }  •
where f ,  =f,j + f IK and f j  = -fu + fJK. As before, this set describes a triangle with the g-axis. 
The three subsets are mutually exclusive (either f u <,> or = 0) so a given contract can belong 
to at most one of them. The new feature is that the sides of the triangle are subjected to 
parallel shifts by AjfJK and A,f,K respectively that is, the quantities of the two other contracts 
matter, because they enter jointly with f u in the respective agents’ risk evaluations. This 
requires that any trade with K  be common knowledge, or, in other words, that the three 
contracts be coordinated.
Solving for the bilateral core we find that the quantities should satisfy the following
system:
(  \
f  \ A.+A A, -A , ( r  \
Pj-P, / J J flJ
P k ~Pi = A, A , +A k fut
P k ~Pj\  ) A k A j +A k l 1KJ
(33)
This system exhibits linear dependence with one degree of freedom and the profile (JuJ ikJjk) 
is thus left undetermined. The three traders’ net positions are, however, uniquely determined 





























































































and prices should satisfy
H M \  /« * *  ’ + Y f » - q>J -  q ' -  T flJ,U
«iufu>  I fu<°- 9 * + -  Y f ", u
« i M  I /,-0A
(35)
Note that if one quantity is fixed, say /„, then the two other quantities are uniquely 
determined by (34) and the IR requirements on forward prices are uniquely given by (35) and 
similar expressions for qlK and qJK.
Phlips and Harstad (1991) propose a relatively simple non-cooperative game and show 
that the solution will satisfy (34) and (35). However, their game exhibits a continuum of 
subgame perfect equilibria and does not explain how the agents achieve coordination to pick 
one profile of three contracts that will satisfy (34).
4.2 Strategic Bargaining
The extension of the strategic bargaining game of Section 3.2 from two to three players is as 
follows: In any period x, there is probability l/3 that any two players are matched excluding 
the third from playing in that period. In each match, each of the two players then have 
probability l/2 of being the one to make an offer, which the other can accept or reject. The 
game then moves on to period x+1.
This is a stochastic game: the history at x, h(x-l) = (h,(x-1),h /x- l),hK(x-l)) can be 
summarized in a state variable, k(x) (as will be shown in due course):
k(x) consists of the profile of net-positions of the preceding period, F(h(x-1)), the identity of 
the agent who is chosen to make an offer, together with the identity of the player who is 
chosen to receive the offer and the player that is idle at x. It also includes time, x, explicitly 
since the number of periods left may be important for the strategies. Note that there are
k(x) = (F(h(x-1) , offerer , receiver , idle , x) , 





























































































redundancies in the state variable, since
£ F ( h f x - l ) )  = 0 , Vx, (37)
and since the identity of the idle player is known by exclusion, but the notation (36) is 
maintained since it appears more intuitive and more symmetric. Expected payoffs at x, g(x) 
= (g(h^l-l)),g(hj(T-l)),g(hf1(%-l))), depend on k(x) and on current actions, these being a 
contract offer, acceptance/rejection and a void action for the unmatched, idle player.
The state follows a Markov process in that the probability distribution on k(x+l) is 
determined by k(x) and the actions taken at x. For example, assume that the state is
and that /  offers to buy a contract from K  in period x. If K  rejects (r), then k(x+l) will be one 
of the following six states, each of which has probability 1/6:
in that the profile of net-positions remains unchanged in case of rejection. If K accepts (a), 
then F(h(x)) = (F(hjx-l)) - 7, F(h/x-l)), F(hK(x-l)) + 1) and the state will belong to:
with transition function Pr(k(x+1)\ k(x), (c,,,a)) -  1/6. In the example the players’ action 
spaces are S,=/c, J  (the right to propose a contract), SK = (a,r) (the right to accept it or reject 
it) and Sj = 0  (the right to remain silent). In general, we have the following definition:
Definition 1: (Action Spaces) In any state k(x) = (F(h(x-l),i,j,k,x), the action spaces are S: = 
( c j ,  Sj = (a,r), Sk = 0 ,  (i,j,k) is any permutation of (I,J,K). Let S = S .xS xS t , with 
s(xMsfx),s/x),sk(x)) 6 S.
In principle strategies could depend on the entire history of the game. However, for 
any subgame starting in some period x, only k(x) matters. To show this, we adapt the 
following definitions from Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) (pp. 514-5): The future at x is the 
current and future actions <I>(x) = (s(x), s(X+l), .... s(T)) 6 S7'1 following choices of i, j  and 
k by nature. In the following, h and h '  denote two different histories.






























































































Definition 2: (Sufficient Partition o f Histories) A partition {FP( is sufficient if Vx and 
\/h (x - l) ,h '(x - l) \  PT(h(x-l)) = PP(h'(x-1)), the subgames starting at date x after histories 
h(x-l) and h '(x - l)  are strategically equivalent, i.e.
(i) The action spaces in the subgames are identical: Vie(I,J,K), Vt>0 and Vs(x+t-l),
S(h(x-l),s(x).... s(T)) = S fh  '(X-l),s(x),...,s(T)).
(ii) The players’ payoffs conditional on h(x-l) and h '(x - l)  are representations of the 
same preferences.
Definition 3: The Payoff-Relevant History is the coarsest sufficient partition.
From these two definitions we obtain Lemma 4:
Lemma 4: The payoff relevant history is summarized by F(h(x-1)).
Proof: The claim is that a partition, Pf, of histories leading to the same F(h(x-1)) is sufficient. 
Let h(x-l) and h '(x-1 ) be two histories for which F(h(x-1)) = F (h ' (x-1)). The action spaces 
are time invariant, so the first condition is satisfied. We now need to show that the payoffs 
conditional on any two histories that lead to the same profile of net positions at x-1 represent 
the same underlying preferences. The original preferences, ufit.) = -exp(-Api), are von 
Neumann-Morgenstem, so unique up to a linear transformation. What we need to show is thus
that \/ie /I,J ,K ) 3 (X  , p ,)  = [x .\h (x -l),h '(x -1 )]  , p. [h (x -l) ,h / (x-1)]] (X > 0) such that
V4>(xj, G (h.(x-l),Q (x)) = X.G (h'(x-l),O(x)) + p r
By the definition of G( ■ ; ■), we have G (hfx-l),^(x)) = V(hfX-l)) + V(<t>/x)) - 
p fF fh fx -l)) + F(<-J>fx))) + (A/2) (F(hfx-l)) + F ( t where we abuse the notation slightly, 
so that VfO/xJj and Ff^Jx))) denote respectively Vs book value and her (change in) net 
position arising from a given future O(x). It is easily seen that pfh(x), h '( x ) ,)  = V(hfx-l)) - 
V((h'(x-1)) and X .(h(x-l),h '(x-l)) = 1, so the payoffs conditional on any history that leads 
to F(h(x-1)) represent the same underlying preferences:
G(h.(x-l),<t>(x)) = G(h'(x-l),Q>(x)) + V(h(x-1)) -  V(h'(x-l)).m
Remark: The proof shows that payoffs after any two histories that lead to the same positions 
only differ with respect to the book value of the previously concluded contracts, which has 




























































































Definition 4: A Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) is a profile of strategies s' that is a 
subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) and depends on only the payoff relevant history, i.e.
H(h(x-1)) = H(h '(1-1)) => Vi, s,'(h(x-l))=s’(h '(%-!)).
In view of Lemma 4 we can let strategies depend on the profile of net positions, so 
that an MPE is a strategy profile s* that is an SPE and that is measurable w.r.t. F(h(x-I)):
s ’ = s,'(F(h(x-l))), Vi.
Let K(x) denote the set of feasible states after a history leading to a set of forward 
positions, F(h(x-I)). We have existence of MPE in the game:
Proposition 4: There exists a Markov perfect equilibrium for the game T, =
(N = /I,J ,K I, x-l,.,T , k(x)e K(x), s(x)eS, Pr(k(x+l)/k(x),s(x)), (G(h/T)))VieN).
Proof: The proof will be a special case of the «-person game of the later Section 5.2.■
Having claimed existence of equilibrium, we characterize the equilibrium as far as 
possible without knowing the essential parameters, T and (At ,p ,), i e  (I,J,Kj. In three 
propositions we show the counterpart to Proposition 1 for the two player case: there is a
(generically unique) F(h(x-1)) in the neighbourhood of (//,//,/*’) such that in all states after 
a history leading to F(h(X-l)), there will be no trade. These absorbing states are in other 
words uniquely determined by a single combination of net positions that determine how close 
the players can hope to come to efficiency.
Proposition 5: Trading stops if the game reaches a state where
F (h fx -l))  = / /  + 5,
F (h fx - l))  = / /  + 8, (41)
F th jx -D )  = / ;  -  (8, + bj)
































































































< (Ai+Ak) 8, ♦ A A  <
2
Proof: If RBfx) < RS/x), V i,j , tej, there are no further gains from trade. Manipulation of 
this system of inequalities yields (41) and (42). ■
Remark: Generically, all states like the one mentioned in the proposition are ergodic 
(absorbing): Once that kind of state has been reached, the market stays in it in all subsequent 
periods.
Remark: The proposition shows how close the market can get to the bilateral core: only if 
/ , ’ and f j  are integers can the ergodic states be efficient (8, = 8d = 0).
Figures 6.a and b show the range of (8,,8j)  that satisfy the six inequalities for the two 
cases when A, = Aj = AK = A (Figure 6.a) and A, = A /2  = Af/3 = A (Figure 6.b). Note that 


















































































































































































































































































Proposition 6: The only ergodic states (F(h(Z-l),i,j,k) are those that satisfy Proposition 5.
Proof: In order for a state to be ergodic at date z < T, we need RB:(x) < RS/z), V/'j, i * j . 
This leads to the following set of inequalities:
P, -  Pj
A.+A, A.+A,
^ - 1  < A / ,  -  A f ,  < P, - Pj + - L J .
A,+Ay A.+A,
P, ~ Pk ~ — ,r -  -  a kFk -  AF , ^ P ,  ~ PK + — r - (43)
A,+A„
Pj -  Pk *  AkFk -  A/ j  ^ P j  -  Pk
A j +Ak
where (F,,Fj,FK) are net positions at z-1 (F^Fj+Ff—O). Let F, = / /  + 5, and Fs = f j  + 
where the only restriction on the 8’s is that when they are added to the corresponding 
efficient positions, the result be an integer. Combining (33) and (34), we get
a / j ~ A ,F, = P, -  Pj -  AA  + AjZj
- AF , = Pi -  Pk -  ( W 8, - AA .  (44)
A kF k -  A f j  =  P j  -  P k ~ A A  -  <A j +AkA
which combined with (43) gives the desired result.■
Proposition 7: The positions in the ergodic states are (generically) unique.
Proof: Let F(h(z-1)) = (F,,Fj,Fk) be the forward positions of an absorbing state. The pair (F, 
,Fj ) thus satisfies
Pi -  Pj
a , +Aj
2
< A / j  -  A f ,  < p , -  Pj a , +Aj
2
There are six candidates for ergodic positions in the neighbourhood of F(h(z-1)), namely 
(F„Fj,Fk) + x  where x e 1(1, -1,0),(-1,1,0),(1,0, -1),(-1,0,1),(0,1, -1),(0, -1 ,1 » . Take the first 
element. If A,Ft - A,F, < p, - Pj + (A, + A,)/2, we have A /F j- l) - A/F,+l) < p, - P] - (A, + 
Aj)/2, so (F,,Fj,Fk) + (1,-1,0) is not an ergodic position. If AjFj - A,F, = p, - Pj + (A, + A»/2, 
we have A /F r I) - A,(F,+1) = p, - p, - (A, + A»/2, so (F„Fj,FK) + (1,-1,0) is also an ergodic 
position, and there can be a cycle back and forth between the two, this adding nothing to the 




























































































4.3 An Example of a Markov Perfect Equlibrium
To get a feel for the nature of the Markov perfect equilibrium, consider the following simple 
numerical example. Assume that the basic parameters of the model are chosen to be:
Spot price expectations: p, = 20.0, Pj = 19.0, Pk = 18-0
Risk aversion constants: A, = 0.2, Aj = 0.4, 0.6
Time horizon: r  = 3
The competitive equilibrium is found to be:
—  = 19— , s;> = (-3 — .— ,2— >,
11 11 11 11 11
and the positions in the ergodic states are (F,, FJt FK) = (-3,1,2) (i.e. (&,,bK) = (2/11,1/11)). 
The case fits Figure 6.b. By trading with each other, the three players can reach thirty-seven 
different combinations of forward positions at T = 3. These are illustrated in Figure 7.
The game starts with F(h(0)) = (0,0,0) and can go to seven different "nodes" at x = 
1: (0,0,0), (0,-l,l), (-1,0,1), (-1,1,0), (0,1,-1), (1,0,-1) and (1,-I,0). From these an additional 
twelve nodes can be reached at t  = 2 and further eighteen can be reached at x = 3 when the 
game ends. Each arrow represents a possible transition and to be complete the figure should 
include semi-circular arrows representing the possibility of remaining at each node. The MPE 
assigns equilibrium probabilities to each arrow conditional on being at a given node at a given 
X. Many of these probabilities are zero in equilibrium.
The MPE is shown in Figure 8. All arrows there have probability 1/3 representing the 
probability of a match between /  and J, I  and K. and J and K  at each node (after each payoff 
relevant history). At (0,0,0) there is thus probability 1/3 that I  buys from J leading to (-1,1,0). 
From there, the probability is again 1/3 that I  buys from K  leading to (-2,1,1) and from this 
node, the probability that 1 can strike another deal with K  leading to the ergodic state (-3,1,2) 
is again 1/3. The probability of this path is (l /3 f .  There are two other ways to get to (-3,1,2), 
so the overall probability of ending up in the desired node is 1/9. But the market can end up 
rather far from it also: If J  and K  are matched three times (an event that happens with 
probability 1/27), the outcome will be an initial trade to (0,-1,1) whereafter trading stops. This 
is because the gains from trade between J and K  are exhausted after only one trade: All paths 
in Figure 8 include at most one horizontal arrow.
The expected payoff at x = 0 is (0.6282. 0.3065, 0.5125) compared to (1.0124, 0.1653,




























































































Figure 7: Markov Lattice
M a r k o v
c h a i n
/  \  /  \  /  \  / \
. 1 , 1 ' - ------- - - 3 .2 ,0  --------- ►( 3 ,3 ,-1
/ V/ V / \
( - 3 - 0 ,3 \ 3 , 1,3  - 3 ,3 ,1  - 3 .3 ,0
Horizontal arrows: Trade between J  and K\ Left-down/Up-Right Arrows: Trade between /  and 


























































































































































































We now turn to the n>2 player case. A typical player is called I, / e  N=fl,2,...,nj. As in the 
two preceding sections we first treat the axiomatic approaches in which the time dimension 
is suppressed and find the competitive equilibrium (the futures market equilibrium) and the 
bilateral core (the efficiency standard). We then move on to a full scale strategic bargaining 
model with a proof of existence of equilibrium in the «-person game and a characterization 
of the ergodic states.
5.1: Axiomatic approaches: Futures market equilibrium and bilateral core
As a benchmark, first assume that the players form a standard futures market which is 
assumed to be competitive, yielding a single market clearing price, q . Also assume that their 
different price expectations are common knowledge. Each player’s payoff is then given by
Gf-;Ar p,)  = (q-  -  p,)f,  -  . <45)
If q’ is taken as given, the agent only optimizes with respect to the net position,/,, and 
the (futures) market equilibrium is given by
/ /  = q ' ~ Pl = L  — Y P‘ ~ V/g N  (46)
A. n A. ,=7 A
q ' (47)
where Am is the harmonic mean of the risk aversion coefficients (1/A"’ is the arithmetic mean 
risk tolerance). A/A m is the individual risk aversion relative to the market risk aversion. The 
market clearing price is fully revealing in the sense that it is the weighted mean opinion of 
the spot price, the weights being the agent’s risk tolerance relative to the sum of the risk 
tolerances. This is the "market’s spot price expectation" and it fully reflects the market 
participants’ opinions weighted by their willingness to bet on them.
Now assume that the market is one in which the participants enter bilateral contracts, 




























































































0 (- ;A ,,p ,)  = J T  K  -  Pi
VieN̂ I/ (48)
w here/, = 5 2  fu ,VIeN.
VieWU
To belong to the bilateral core, the quantities have to fulfil 
Pj - p, = a j , -  Ajfj v i ,j , (49)
which is satisfied only by / / ,  V/. Prices should satisfy individual rationality given these 
quantities, i.e. contracts should belong to
The bilateral core thus consists of n contracts where the quantities and prices satisfy (46) and 
(50). Note that the market equilibrium (46-47) belongs to the core.
5.2 Strategic bargaining: the decentralized market game
The stochastic game F„ is defined by 
© a set of players, N  = (l,...,n)
© a time horizon T> 1: x =
@ a set of states k(x) e  K(z)
© a set of actions s(z) e S(z)
© a transition function: Pr[k(x+1)] = Pr[k(z+1) \ k(x) , s(x)]
© a payoff function for each /  6 N: G(h/T); A,,p,)
The state variable k(x) consists of an n-vector of forward positions, F(h(x-1)), a 
realization of the matching technology M(x) and the time index, x:
and K(x) is the set of states that is feasible after any history leading to a given F(h(x-1)).
(50)
{(<7,r 4>l f j  = 0\ Vi.j c- N, itj.




























































































The vector of forward positions for the n players at the beginning of period x is 
defined in an obvious extension of the notation for the three player case:
F(h(x-I)) = (F(h,(X-l).....  F(hjx-l))). (52)
The matching technology is called M  and a particular realization at time x is denoted by M(x). 
Let <O.R> denote an ordered pair and let 5 be a set of integers with ffS = 2k, where k  is a 
positive integer. Finally, let Ms denote the set of k  ordered pairs exhausting S, i.e. an element 
fj s Ms is a collection t< 0,,R ;>, <02,R2>. —. <0„RK>! such that 0,,R, e  5, Vi = 1, k , 
Oj Oj and R, * Rj V i , j  = 1, k  w . te j and 0, *  Rr V i , j  = 1, k .
If n = #N is even, the matching technology simply maps from the set of players to a 
set of w2 ordered pairs:
M: N Mn . (53)
In other words, an outcome of the matching technology chooses n/2 matches and in each 
match, m (m e p <e Mn), the identity of the offerer, 0,„, and of the receiver of the offer, Rm. 
If n is even, an outcome of M  becomes M(x) = (<0,,Ri>, < 02,R2>, <0^2,R„^>) with Oh
Rj e  N, i = 1, .... n, O, * 0Jt R, * RJt V i.j = l,.,n/2, i *  j, and 0, * Rp V i,j. In the "even" 
case, the matching technology maps from the set of players to the set of possible two- 
permutations of this set. The probability of a particular outcome of the map is
p { m (x) = p € m J  = (n ~ 2)! = 1 (54)
1 1 n! n(n -  1)
since all outcomes are equally likely by assumption.
If n = #N is odd, M maps from N  to the space of (n-l)/2 ordered pairs plus the identity 
of the idle player:
M: N  -> ,x N . (55)N\{ldlel
An outcome of the matching technology now determines the identity of the idle player and 
(n-l)/2 matches exhausting the n-1 non-idle players and within each match, m 
(m  e ju e MAVWW), the identity of the offerer, 0„„ and of the receiver of the offer, Rm. For 
n odd, an outcome of M becomes
M(x) = (f-i, Idle) — ((<0,,RI>, <02,R2>, .... <0(n.l)/2,Rln.iy2>J, Idle).




























































































Pr[M(v) -  (p ,Idle) s  M ^ x n ] -  < ? - J l -  -------_L------  (56)
1 n! n (n  -  l) (n  -  2)
since for each player there is probability 1/n of being idle at x and for the n-1 remaining 
players, there are (n-1 )!/(n-3)! two-permutations.
Given an outcome of M, in each match m e p, the offerer, O, has action space S0 = 
(cm /, that is, she can propose to buy or sell a contract at a price of her choice, or she can 
choose not to propose a deal, so S0 = {(q ,1), (q ,-l), (q,..,0): q e  JJ ). The receiver in m
can accept (a) or reject (r), so SR = {a,r). A possible idle player has Sulr = 0 .  The strategy 
space of a player thus depends on whether the outcome of the macthing technology makes 
her offerer, receiver or idle. In any state k(z), action spaces for the market in that state are
S = (S0 x if n is even
(57)
n-1
S = (S0 x 0  if n is odd.
Given today’s state, k(z), and today’s actions, ^(t), a new profile of net positions 
appears: F(h(z)). Given this, the probability of a state
k(x+l) = (F(h(z)), M(z+1) = p , z+1) (58)
will be (n-2)!/n! if n is even and (n-3)'/n! if n is odd. These are the transition probabilities. 
When the players have chosen the trades leading to a new F  (the first element of the state 
variable at z+1, then nature chooses a new outcome of the matching technology, M(z+1) (the 
second element of the state variable), and one period has passed so t = z+1 (the third entry 
of the state variable). The sequence of events in each period x is as follows:
0. The realization of k(z) = (F(h(z-l)j, M(z), z) becomes common knowledge (c.k.).
1. The Offerers simultaneously propose a contract (not c.k.).
2. The Receivers simultaneously accept or reject (not c.k.).
3. The Idle player (simultaneously with 1 and 2) does nothing (c.k.).
4. The actions in 1, 2 and 3 lead to F(h(z)).




























































































Lemma 4 still applies: the payoff relevant history is summarized by the forward 
positions at the beginning of the period, F(h(i-1)). Indeed, the proof is independent of the 
number of players. We can also extend the essential proof of existence for the three person 
game, r(, to the n-person game, T„:
Proposition 8: There exists a Markov perfect equilibrium for the game T„.
Proof: If the set of actions S were finite, the proof would be a trivial adaption to T„ of the 
more general Theorem 13.2 in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) (p. 515). However there are no 
restrictions on the price an offerer can propose apart from positivity, so SQ is infinite. But 
there are restrictions on the quantities that the offerer can propose, viz. to buy one unit, to sell 
one unit or not to do anything, and thus S0 = ( cmJ  qm e  Rt A f m e  {-1.0,111- This means 
that there is a finite number of feasible states that can be reached during the game and 
subgame perfect equlibrium requires that the strategy be optimal at any state, be they reached 
or not.
At T, in any feasible state k(T), Om will propose a contract to R,„ that either is equal 
to Rm’s reservation price if there are gains from trade to be made and which Rm then will 
accept or is IR to Om if not, and then Rm will reject. Reservation prices are functions of the 
state via F(h(T-l)).
At T-l, the subgame starting there can be solved with knowledge of what is going to 
happen at T  in each of the states possible at T and of the transition function Pr(k(T)\k(T-l), 
s(T-l)). Continuing the backward recursion, an MPE appears.®
We also get the n-person equivalent of Propositions 4 - 6  establishing existence and 
(generic) uniqueness of the absorbing states for the three person game:
Proposition 9: Trading stops if the game reaches a state in which
F(hfz-l ) )  = F '  * 8, , Vi e N, (59)
where Vi,y the 8,’s satisfy
2
and
E  5i = °- (61)
V« 6 N
_ A _ 8  -  — —— 5 < L  (60)




























































































Remark: The 5,’s are again to be understood as the real numbers that when added to the 
respective efficient quantities of the bilateral core yield integers. Weighed by the relative risk 
aversion the difference between the 8’s of any two players should numerically be less than 
1/2 .
Proof: If R B I x )  < RSp V i , j  e N, f c j ,  there are no further gains from trade. Solving this
system of inequalities yields the desired result. ■
Proposition 10: The only ergodic states k(x) are those that satisfy proposition 9.
Proof: In any ergodic state we need RBt(x) < RS/i)  and RB/x) < RS/x) for all i and j. This 
leads to the following set of inequalities:
P, -L < A F  -  A F < p -  pJ J I ‘ ' J
(62)
where F  = (F ,, F2, ..., Ft , ..., F,:) s  F(h(x-1)) is the profile of net positions at x-1. Let
Ft = F ' + 8; , V i e  N  where the only restriction on the 5’s is that when added to the
respective efficient position, the result must be an integer. From (49) we then get
A F - A F  = A F '  -  A F '  + A.5 -  A S = p - p . + A S -  A Sj  j  i i  j  J i '  j  j  i i f , r j  j  j  i ,
which combined with (62) gives the desired result. ■
Proposition 11: The positions in the ergodic states are (generically) unique.
Proof: Let F(h(x-1)) = (F„ FJ  be the forward positions of an ergodic state. F(h(x)) thus 
satisfies (62) for all i,j e  N. Let x be an n-vector of integers such that e ' x  = 0 where e = 
(1, 1, .... 1) is an «-vector too. Let x 0. There must then be at least one element of x  that 
is positive and at least one that is negative. Pick a positive element, ,r„ and a negative, xp with 
the indices, i and j  corresponding to the "name" of the agent. We have x, > 1 and x2 < -1, and 
now have to show that F(h(x-1)) cannot be an ergodic state. From this state we have 
A.(F. + x.) -  A.(F. + x.) = A F + A F. + (A.x. -  A .x ). We know thatJy J J'  r  i /  j  j  i i '  j  j  i t '
A.Xj -  A .xi < ~(At + A t), so if we have strict inequality of (62), then
A + A
Aj(F. + Xj) -  A t(F. + x j  < p t -  pt -  ‘ ‘ so F(h(x-1)) + x  is not ergodic. If we
have equality of (62) by coincidence and if (*, , xt ) = (1
A. +A
A /F j + x ^  -  A .(F . + x.) = p. -  Pj -  -
1), then 




























































































A Markov perfect equilibrium of r„ can be interpreted along the lines of the two and 
three person markets, T2 and F (, which indeed are special cases. But for n > 3 a new feature 
appears: the possibility of multiple Markov perfect equilibria stemming from the possibility 
of multiple Nash equilibria at each state: when there is more than one simultaneous match in 
a given period, optimality of a decision within a given match may hinge on the outcome of 
other matches at that time. The outcome of the matching technology is common knowledge, 
but the actions are not, and since the play across matches is simultaneous, problems of the 
following sort may arise: The optimality of any pairs’ decision hinges on what the entire trade 
vector looks like. A trade vector is an «-vector of possible (-1, 0 ,1 }  where the sum of the 
elements is zero. The entire vector determines the state in the next period, which in turn 
determines expected continuation payoffs. So it may be optimal for one pair of agents to 
agree on a contract if and only if another pair agrees on a contract, and vice versa.
Whether multiple MPE occurs is a matter of choice of parameters, but in general the 
set-up allows for that.10 This introduces the possibility of coordination failure (failure to 
coordinate on the same Nash equilibrium) on top of the other inefficiencies of the market 
(stemming from indivisibilities and from not being able to control the matching process). The 
next section looks at whether one can expect convergence of the process to the efficient 
outcome as one parameter, the time horizon, T  goes to infinity.
6. Convergence and Decentralized vs. Centralized Trade
In this section we first (6.1) discuss convergence of the Markov perfect equilibrium of T„ to 
the ergodic states, which is the closest the market can come to efficiency. Then (6.2) we 
compare T„ to other models of decentralized trade and conclude (6.3) with a comment on 
forward markets compared to futures markets.
6.1 Inefficiency and Convergence lo Efficiency
Compared to a competitive standard, the outcome of T„ (n > 2) is inefficient: there is always 
a positive probability that the game ends with a set of forward positions that does not belong 
to the ergodic states. The heuristic proof of this point is simple: re-order the players from 1 
through n according to the value of p,/A,, so p /A , is lowest and pn/A„ is highest. The event 
that 1 and 2, 3 and 4, ..., n-1 and n (or if n is odd: n-2 and n-1) are matched in every period
10 It would seem that for n > 4, the game generically possesses multiple equilibria, so that 
the parameter space in terms of {A,, p :] and T  for which this happens is topologically large. 




























































































Remark: The 8,’s are again to be understood as the real numbers that when added to the 
respective efficient quantities of the bilateral core yield integers. Weighed by the relative risk 
aversion the difference between the 8’s of any two players should numerically be less than 
1/2.
Proof: If RB,(x) < RSp V i , j  e  N, f r j , there are no further gains from trade. Solving this
system of inequalities yields the desired result.H
Proposition 10: The only ergodic states k(x) are those that satisfy proposition 9.
Proof: In any ergodic state we need RBt(x) < RS/x) and RB/x) < RS/x) for all i and j. This 
leads to the following set of inequalities:
P, < A.F. -  A.F. < p -  pi i 1 ' rJ
A + A (62)
where F = (F,, F2, Ft , .... Fnj  = F(h(x-I)) is the profile of net positions at x-1. Let 
F. = F ’ + 8., V i e  N  where the only restriction on the 8’s is that when added to the 
respective efficient position, the result must be an integer. From (49) we then get
A.F. -  A.F. = A.F. A.F, A 8 - / 4 8  = p. -  pJ J I ' r  I r  J A 8 -  A 8J J ‘ ‘
which combined with (62) gives the desired result.l
Proposition 11: The positions in the ergodic states are (generically) unique.
Proof: Let F(h(x-1)) = (F,, .... FJ  be the forward positions of an ergodic state. F(h(x)) thus 
satisfies (62) for all i,j e  N. Let x be an n-vector of integers such that e ' x  -  0 where e = 
(1, 1, ..., / )  is an n-vector too. Let x £ 0. There must then be at least one element of x that 
is positive and at least one that is negative. Pick a positive element, and a negative, x,, with 
the indices, i and j  corresponding to the "name" of the agent. We have xt > l  and x2 < -1, and 
now have to show that F(h(x-I)) cannot be an ergodic state. From this state we have 
A.(F  + x.) -  A.(F. + x.) = A.F. + A.F. + (A.x. -  A .x ). We know thatJ'  J V  i '  l  • J J i i  ' l l  i r
AjXj -  A.jc. < ~(Af + A(), so if we have strict inequality of (62), then
A. + A _
AjfFj + Xj) -  A.(F. + x.) < p. -  p. -  —1 — l , so F(h(x-1)) + x  is not ergodic. If we
have equality of (62) by coincidence and if (xt , x; ) -  (1. -1), then
A. +A.




























































































A Markov perfect equilibrium of F„ can be interpreted along the lines of the two and 
three person markets, F2 and r „  which indeed are special cases. But for n > 3 a new feature 
appears: the possibility of multiple Markov perfect equilibria stemming from the possibility 
of multiple Nash equilibria at each state: when there is more than one simultaneous match in 
a given period, optimality of a decision within a given match may hinge on the outcome of 
other matches at that time. The outcome of the matching technology is common knowledge, 
but the actions are not, and since the play across matches is simultaneous, problems of the 
following sort may arise: The optimality of any pairs’ decision hinges on what the entire trade 
vector looks like. A trade vector is an n-vector of possible 1-1, 0 , 1 )  where the sum of the 
elements is zero. The entire vector determines the state in the next period, which in turn 
determines expected continuation payoffs. So it may be optimal for one pair of agents to 
agree on a contract if and only if another pair agrees on a contract, and vice versa.
Whether multiple MPE occurs is a matter of choice of parameters, but in general the 
set-up allows for that.10 This introduces the possibility of coordination failure (failure to 
coordinate on the same Nash equilibrium) on top of the other inefficiencies of the market 
(stemming from indivisibilities and from not being able to control the matching process). The 
next section looks at whether one can expect convergence of the process to the efficient 
outcome as one parameter, the time horizon, T  goes to infinity.
6. Convergence and Decentralized vs. Centralized Trade
In this section we first (6.1) discuss convergence of the Markov perfect equilibrium of F„ to 
the ergodic states, which is the closest the market can come to efficiency. Then (6.2) we 
compare T„ to other models of decentralized trade and conclude (6.3) with a comment on 
forward markets compared to futures markets.
6.1 Inefficiency and Convergence to Efficiency
Compared to a competitive standard, the outcome of T„ (n > 2) is inefficient: there is always 
a positive probability that the game ends with a set of forward positions that does not belong 
to the ergodic states. The heuristic proof of this point is simple: re-order the players from 1 
through n according to the value of p,/A„ so p /A , is lowest and pn/A„ is highest. The event 
that 1 and 2, 3 and 4, ..., n-1 and n (or if n is odd: n-2 and n-1) are matched in every period
10 It would seem that for n > 4, the game generically possesses multiple equilibria, so that 
the parameter space in terms of (A;, p,} and T  for which this happens is topologically large. 




























































































t  = 1, T has a positive probability (that is decreasing in T, however). Obviously to be 
efficient, the long positions at T  should be concentrated at high values of i (i e  fl ,.,n j) 
whereas short positions should be concentrated at low values of i. However, this is impossible 
given the outlined event.
Generally, there are several sequences of matchings in t = 1,.,T that can lead to 
efficient outcomes (as in the three trader example of Section 4.3) but also several sequences 
for which the efficient positions can not possibly be reached. What the probabilities are and 
how close the market can get to the efficient positions depends on how large these positions 
are and how they are distributed, i.e. on Ip^AJ (Vi e N), on the one hand and on the 
matching probabilities (i.e. on n) and the time horizon, T, on the other. Indeed, one would 
expect the following conjecture to hold true:
In a Markov Perfect Equilibrium o f T,, the efficient positions 
are reached almost surely as T
A very rough and heuristic proof of this goes as follows:11 12we have already shown that there 
is a generically unique set of ergodic states for a given T.'2 If the process converges to 
anything, it must be to the ergodic states. To show convergence implies to show that the 
process is a contraction - but it must be, since any trade reduces the aggregate gains from 
trade left for the future.
For any given T, the MPE of F„ describes a Markov chain. The reason why standard 
techniques of showing convergence of Markov chains do not work here is that as T increases, 
the transition probabilities among existing states may change and the size of the state space 
increase: there are a number of new feasible states that were not reachable for a smaller T. 
As T -> °o, the state space becomes infinity too (and actually this happens at a faster rate).
At the risk of belabouring the last point, the problem is that even though for any 
(finite) T  the state space is finite, if a period T+l is introduced, this increases the number of 
feasible states by more than one to one. To see this, consider the example of Section 4.3 and 
Figure 8: if a period T=4 is introduced, twenty-four new feasible profiles of forward positions 
pop up. For the three person case, the number of feasible nodes as a function of T is:
11 Another argument is that Gale (1987) gets convergence to the competitive equilibrium 
in a somewhat similar set-up. The difference is that Gale has an infinite time horizon and that 
he then studies convergence of equilibrium as a function of parameters like the time 
preferences (as the traders get more patient, the equilibrium converges to the competitive 
equilibrium).
12 Ignoring that all states that are reached at T  are ergodic in the sense that the game ends, 




























































































(63)1 + 6 £ i
which clearly increases six times faster than T. In the more general n-person game, each node 
that is reachable at T-l has number of neighbours:
(64)
for n even and
(65)
for n odd. For example, if there are twenty players (n = 20) each node reachable at T-l has 
377,379,368 neighbours! For a larger number of players, the state space increases faster than 
for the three player case, thus emphasizing the point that the number of states grows rapidly 
as T ->
The conjecture is so much more remarkable considering that it requires the equilibrium 
to be a contraction in an expanding state space. The reasoning behind this is that the agents 
will not use the extra states (given that the ergodic states were already reachable), but will 
rather use the extra time available to get to more attractive nodes (forward positions) among 
the already existing ones: returning to the example and Figure 8, in the three player case 
F(h(3)) = (0,-1,1) could be an equilibrium outcome if J and K  are matched for three 
consecutive periods. This event has probability (1/3)3 = 1/27 ex ante. If the transition 
probabilities that are indicated in Figure 8 remain the same as T  increases, then the ex ante 
probability of this deadlock decreases rapidly (exponentially) with T. The conjecture thus 
implies that when T  increases, there will be few or no new nodes in Figure 8 and some nodes 
may even drop out because the probability of getting to a more attractive state increases. In 
other words, as the state space ramifies, Markov perfect equilibria effectively prune away new 
branches.
6.2 Models of decentralized trade
The model presented in Sections 2 through 6 is one of decentralized trade. It obviously has 
links to other models of decentralized trade. This section seeks to make the connection and 
to show the differences.
Gale (1988) makes an important distinction between models of ex ante pricing where 




























































































and models of ex post pricing where the agents get together before prices are quoted. Our 
model belongs to the ex post category in that the players are matched before contracts are 
proposed.
In the framework of ex ante pricing, three papers by Ostroy and Starr (1974) and Starr 
(1976; 1986) treat points similar to ours: in a general equilibrium setting, the question 
addressed is whether a competitive equilibrium can be implemented by a decentralized trading 
process. The equilibrium prices (and quantities) are determined by a Walrasian auctioneer, but 
the agents are not allowed to hand the net trade vector over to the auctioneer so there is no 
centralized clearing. Instead, the agents have to sort the equilibrium out themselves in 
pairwise meetings. In each round of trading, every trader meets every other trader in an 
arbitrary order, so the only uncertainty is with respect to the order of matches, not with 
respect to whether they get matched or not. Within this set-up, Ostroy and Starr show that in 
a barter economy it is in general not possible to find a decentralized procedure that achieves 
the competitive equilibrium, but in a monetary economy such a decentralized mechanism 
exists. Starr (1976) then shows that if barter trading can implement the competitive 
equilibrium, then there is a monetary trading procedure that does this a good deal faster. In 
fact, the non-monetary procedure may take forever to converge. Finally, Starr (1986) allows 
for ‘short sales' and discusses convergence in different credit economies (commodity credit, 
trade credit and bank credit). None of these institutional set-ups do as well as the monetary 
economy in terms of convergence and even existence of a convergent procedure.
Our model could be seen as a monetary economy with one good (a contract) and with 
ex ante pricing and indeed with the Ostroy and Starr matching technology and trading 
procedure, the competitive equilibrium could quickly and certainly be obtained in 
decentralized trading. Another way of re-interpreting our model in terms of Ostroy and Starr
is that potentially there are = n 2 -  different goods in the forward market: a
contract between I  and J  is different from a contract between I  and K and both are different 
from a contract between J  and K and so forth. This is especially important for the clearing 
procedure in the 15-Day market, where having a long contract with one trader and a short 
with another does not mean that these trades net out: A trader may still have to honour both 
contracts and may thus have to bother about taking and arranging delivery. This is why most 
traders in the 15-Day market close their positions in book-outs and in daisy chains and it is 
also why the assumption that the forward market clears at maturity is not realistic for this 
market. Maturity (in the spot market) is not a point in time but rather a whole month and 
traders want to realize gains and losses before maturity in order not to deal with problems of 
delivery. This renders the market even more inefficient seen from the traders’ point of view. 
The point that is made here, is that not only is the trading on the forward market 
decentralized, but so is the ‘clearing at maturity' which forces the traders to clear before 




























































































house in a futures market is both feasible and more efficient. Note that the market is only one 
step short of this, since one major producer organizes the liftings (actual deliveries) for the 
entire market.
In the framework of ex post pricing, there is a huge and growing literature on strategic 
bargaining applied to markets. An unsurpassed treatment is Osborne and Rubinstein (1990). 
That our model is inspired by, and in line with, this literature, will be clear from the 
following quote:
"Bargaining theory provides a natural framework within which to study price 
formation in markets where transactions are made in a decentralized manner 
via interactions between pairs of agents rather than being organized centrally 
through the use of a formal trading institution like an auctioneer. One might 
describe the aim of investigations in this area as that of providing "mini-micro" 
foundations for the microeconomic analysis of markets and, in particular, of 
determining the range of validity of the Walrasian paradigm. Such a program 
represents something of a challenge for game theorists in that its success will 
presumably generate new solution concepts for market situations intermediate 
between those developed for bilateral bargaining and the notion of Walrasian 
equilibrium." (Binmore, Osborne and Rubinstein (1992)).
The original paper in this strain of literature is Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) in which 
steady states of a market are investigated. The market is partitioned into buyers and sellers 
and they are matched in a stochastic process that renews the pairings every period and that 
is not in the control of the agents. The matching technology of our model can be seen as a 
special case of this. In the Rubinstein/Wolinsky framework, every seller has one unit for sale 
and each buyer wants one unit. Once a match has concluded a deal, the pair leaves the market 
and is then replaced with a new pair, thus keeping stocks of agents constant. The time horizon 
is infinite, but traders have impatient von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions and thus 
an incentive to conclude a deal rather sooner than later. An important conclusion that arises 
from this model is that the market equilibrium of the decentralized market need not be 
competitive. That is, a model that (contrary to the competitive equilibrium) explains the 
formation of prices in equilibrium does not necessarily support a competitive outcome. This 
result has triggered a number of studies of when and why convergence to the competitive 
equilibrium arises (notably Gale (1986a,b; 1987) and McLennan and Sonnenschein (1991)).
Contrary to these studies an important feature of our model is the finite time horizon, 
imposed since the forward contracts eventually mature and since this is clearly perceived by 
the traders. On the other hand, time preferences are not important (traders are infinitely 




























































































equilibrium is inherently dynamic,13 whereas most other models of bargaining and markets 
concentrate on steady states.
6.3 Forward vs. Futures Markets - and the Future
The model that was presented in this paper describes a decentralized, speculative forward 
market and compares the market equilibrium with that of a centralized, competitive market 
that can be thought of as a futures market. It was shown that the decentralized market is 
inferior to the centralized market in that the random matching makes it difficult to coordinate 
on an efficient outcome: There is always a positive probability of not reaching the efficient 
outcome but this probability drops as the traders get more time to complete their affairs.
Matching is not entirely random in reality, but it is not entirely under the control of 
the traders either. Endogenized matching would lead to more complicated transition 
probabilities since matching behaviour should be explained by equilibrium strategies (c/. 
Herreiner (1993)). It is not clear how this would affect Markov perfect equilibrium, but a 
conjecture is that, given the assumption of common knowledge of different priors, there 
would be faster convergence to the efficient outcome, since traders with very different beliefs 
have a common interest in getting together.
The informational requirements that underlie both the model of decentralized trade and 
that of centralized trade are very severe: we have a game of complete information, so the 
different spot price expectations and the different risk aversions are common knowledge. In 
reality, agents face incomplete information. This leads to problems for the agents such as 
identifying who the optimists are (cf. Harstad and Phlips (1993)) and, without further 
specifications of the agents’ knowledge, almost certainly to results of (generic) non-existence 
of Markov perfect equilibrium or to a situation in which any outcome can be rationalized as 
the MPE for appropriate choices of beliefs. Subgame rationalizability may be all one can hope 
for. The way to mode! this may be to let strategies be part of a controlled process in which 
the traders try to leam the spot price expectations of the other traders and to make money at 
the same time. This is a standard learning problem, but with a finite time horizon.
Another informational intricacy stems from the once-and-for-all nature of the spot 
price expectations. New information is likely to appear during trading so agents change their 
mind while trading, revaluing the book value of completed contracts and of future strategies. 
This could be modeled within the framework of common knowledge of different priors by 
exposing the whole vector of price expectations to (e.g. additive or multiplicative) random 
shocks, thus generating the erratic behaviour observed in Figures 1 and 2.
While these modifications (endogenized matching, incomplete information and
13 This is also the case in Gale (1987) and in Binmore and Herrero (1988) but they work 




























































































continuous information on spot prices) are interesting in their own right, it should be clear 
that these problems by no means are assuaged by decentralized trading. It is easier to see how 
an equilibrium with incomplete, imperfect information and a continuous flow of data can lead 
to an efficient outcome in a centralized futures market than in a decentralized forward market 
- and in a futures market, matching is not an issue. It therefore remains a paradox that the 
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